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How Aggressive Parties Negotiate: U.S. Intervention, Terrorist Resistance, and Conflict Resolution.

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What is the relationship between great power aggressive behavior, small group aggressive behavior, and aggressive negotiation behavior to force an end to expansive conflict in international relations? Intervention and terrorism represent strategies of control and influence in situations of power asymmetry: intervention, tool of the strong; terrorism, tool of the weak. Negotiation is a problem solving process of bargaining and communication. Parties seek to accomplish their goals by reaching agreement. Three basic strategies in conflict resolution include: hard power bargaining expressing rights; and focusing on interests. The first is regarded as most aggressive. the last is least. Research shows the ineffectiveness of rights-based approaches, a strong endorsement of interest-based negotiation (though broad evidence indicating its success is slim), and some support for a hard over soft style of bargaining in achieving successful outcomes.

The relationship between intervention and terrorism has been framed as a dispute of ideology, power balance, or social control. As an ideological dispute., two main solutions are separation and isolation between major parties, or conquest by the stronger party over the weaker. As a power imbalance, representing maldistribution of influence and resources, the main solution proposed is military and political withdrawal by the powerful from the colonized areas, substantial economic assistance transfers to the have-not areas, and political support to encourage democratic movements and help build liberal values. In the social control perspective., the solution is to fight until one side is defeated. The latter is seen as the most aggressive motivation, ideological differences as the least aggressive.

In this research, I compare intervention and terrorism as aggressive forms of behavior and analyze the level of aggressiveness in negotiating behavior exhibited by each side to resolve intervention-terrorist problems in three cases: the US-Cuba Hijacking Crisis of 1968-1973, the US-Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981, and the US-al Qaeda Crisis of 1996-2001. that represent instances of U.S. intervention, subsequent terrorist response, and evidence of negotiating behavior—at the bargaining table or through violence expressions in the field.

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